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10.1  Introduction 
The international financial community has often preferred to repeat 
the past rather than study it. Since 1974 international lending has passed 
through another cycle of  enthusiasm followed by nonrepayment and 
creditor revulsion, repeating a pattern that has recurred several times 
since the 18th century. 
The process is costly. Relative to ordinary private lending, lending 
to sovereign foreign debtors brings costs to either side or both sides, 
and often to third parties. The unenforceability of  debt service obli- 
gations sooner or later breeds lasting creditor distrust and cuts the 
supply of  capital to countries where its marginal product is generally 
high. The debtors’ macroeconomies are destabilized by the borrowing 
boom  and  later  bust,  especially  when  the  bust  brings  unforeseen 
austerity. 
Those caught in the current lingering debt crisis cannot blame their 
innocence on an absence of historical literature. That literature was 
vast even before the crisis broke in 1982, and in this chapter we extend 
it in two directions. Section 10.2 discusses creditors’ returns and the 
treatment of defaulters since 1850. Past lending to foreign goverments 
has brought  high private  returns in  the aggregate, but  with  curious 
patterns. Investors seem to have paid  little attention to the past  re- 
payment record of the borrowing governments. They may or may not 
have been  wise in  ignoring the past.  Their inattention,  at any rate, 
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reveals that they do  not punish governments with a prior default history, 
undercutting the belief in a penalty that compels faithful repayment. 
Section 10.3 turns to historical experience with the different policy 
options available in the wake of a major debt crisis. Noting the nec- 
essary imperfections in any policy approach, we discuss some argu- 
ments in  favor  of  the older bond-era  direct confrontation between 
problem debtors and their creditors, an approach that usually  led to 
partial default. The more recent approach of bringing the IMF and the 
World  Bank into tripartite debt-crisis negotiations has brought extra 
costs relating to moral hazard, delays, and macroeconomic adjustment. 
10.2  Sovereign Debt Repayment Since the Early 19th Century 
If there were no third-party rescuer, no International  Monetary Fund, 
how would soverign debt work? How well would creditors and debtors 
be likely to fare? How far below the ex ante contracted rates of return 
were the rates eventually realized by the whole chain of debtholders? 
Were the returns either so excessive or so low that they suggest a case 
for special policy intervention in defense of either debtors or  creditors? 
While the future need  not  match past  patterns, there is a long and 
varied history to tap in forming guesses. 
10.2.1  Background 
Fresh lending to foreign governments followed the same wave-like 
pattern as  other international lending in the 19th century and early 20th 
centuries.  There was a post-Napoleonic wave in the 1820s, including 
loans to most of  the newly  independent nations  of  Latin America, 
followed by  widespread  default.  Gross lending to governments, like 
international lending in general, returned to high tide in the 1850s, in 
the late 1860s-early 1870s, in the late 1880s, in 1904-14,  and again in 
the late 1920s. The wave of lending to foreign governments in the late 
1920s, like that of 1974-82,  exceeded any before World War I in real 
absolute value and even as a share of lender-country GNP. Each wave 
ended with at least some occurrence of repayments breakdown, some- 
times because of international trade depression, sometimes because of 
government budget  crises, and  sometimes  because of  revelation  of 
financial abuses. 
Who defaulted, and when'? Soon after the lending wave of the 1820s 
most Latin American governments defaulted to some degree. Several 
southern states in the United  States defaulted in  the  1830s-40s  and 
again in the Reconstruction era. Latin America and the Eastern Med- 
iterranean (Greece, Turkey and, momentarily, Egypt) figured promi- 
nently in  the default waves of the mid-19th  century. The end of  the 
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able being Argentina’s partial nonrepayment (on which more later) and 
lingering difficulties with Colombia’s debt service. Brazil’s good record 
was finally compromised with repayment lapses necessitating refunding 
loans in  1898  and  1914. The 1910s brought wholesale defaults in the 
Mexican Revolution,  the Russian Revolution, and the fall of the Ot- 
toman Empire. The broadest wave, however, came in the early 1930s 
(Eichengreen and Portes 1986; Eichengreen, chap.  11 in this volume) 
in  which  essentially all of  Latin  America,  most of Eastern Europe, 
Turkey, and China defaulted.  In the early postwar years, with bond 
finance dried up and most of the trickle of loans coming from govern- 
ments or with their guarantees, outright default was replaced  with a 
murmur of  repeated  concessionary refundings  for problem  govern- 
ments, notably Turkey, Latin America, and some newly independent 
nations. The list of countries needing concessionary refundings in the 
1970s and  1980s is  more  extensive but  similar,  still featuring  Latin 
America, Eastern Europe and now much of Africa. 
Other areas always repaid. One was Western Europe outside of Ger- 
many and Spain. Another consisted of the sovereign Arab nations, with 
only slight exceptions. Asia east of the Persian Gulf consistently  repaid, 
except for China in the 1930s, Japan between 1941 and 1952, and the 
independent Philippines. So did the white Commonwealth nations. 
To judge debtors’ repayment behavior or to judge the lenders’ be- 
havior, one needs a careful accounting of their borrowings and debt- 
service outflows.  We  began with the bonds outstanding in  1850, and 
those floated between 1850 and about 1970, following them all the way 
to settlement or to the end of  1983. We  follow the experiences of ten 
borrowing governments: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Egypt, Japan, Mexico, Russia and Turkey. We follow their foreign bond 
debt, drawing on bondholder annuals, periodic compendia of foreign 
investments (Fenn, Fitch, Kimber, Dominick and Dominick, etc.), and 
country studies. We  concentrate on bond lending, with  separate later 
treatment of the brief bank-loan wave of 1974-82. 
10.2.2  Choosing Summary Measures 
Summarizing the flows of real resources between creditors and debt- 
ors calls for three related measures. One is the internal rate of return 
on the loans, with all flows converted into real consumable resources 
in the lending countries. 
The second measure is the real rate of return on an alternative asset, 
used for comparison with the real (and realized) internal rate on foreign 
sovereign debt. The main quantitative results  all compare sovereign 
foreign debt with  home-country  (U.K. and  U.S.) bonds. The third 
summary measure is a net present value of  the foreign sovereign debt 
vis-a-vis home country debt. 228  Peter H. LindedPeter J. Morton 
Table  10.1 sets the stage by  introducing  national average ex ante 
returns and capitalized values contracted at the time of bond issue. In 
the bond era, investors asked for premia (v -  p) on foreign government 
bonds that were usually between  1.5 and 2.6 percent. These premia 
will  serve as a yardstick for several comparisons to follow. We  will 
find, first, that the real realized returns were well below these ex ante 
premia. Virtually all of the shortfall in real realized returns was due 
Table 10.1  Contracted Nominal Returns on Bond Lending to Ten Foreign 
Governments, All Marketed Bonds, 1850-1970  with Payments 
through 1983 
Rates of Return(%)  (Millions of $)  Risk-Neutral 
Borrowing  Expected % of 












































3.47  2.45 
3.64  2.55 
3.94  2.95 
3.11  2.72 
3.52  2.57 
4.52  1.09 
2.82  1.69 
3.29  3.43 
3.51  2.24 
2.92  2.01 
3.33  2.53 
3.86  1.59 














2,476.6  2.31 
1,517.4  2.40 
637.5  2.76 
843.8  2.57 
5,475.4  2.43 
9,836.9  1.03 
1,635.6  1.61 
513.9  3.21 
1,682.4  2.11 
3,456.4  1.92 
1,300.1  2.39 
1  8,425.3  1 so 
23,900.6  1.72 
Notes: 
n = the number of bonds covered here. 
u  = the internal rate of return implied by the bond issue price and repayment terms. 
p = the rate of  interest on bond lending to the home government (U.K.  consol rate or U.S. 
Treasury long-term bond rate, depending on the place of issue). 
NPV = net present value, defined in the following special way: the amount investors were able 
to save by buying the same promised  repayment stream from a foreign government at higher 
interest instead of from the British or U.S. government. 
La = the gross value initially lent to the foreign government. 
The “risk-neutral expected % of capital loss” = (v - a/(l  + u) is a suggestive hypothetical 
measure used here as in Feder and Just (1984). If bond purchasers were risk-neutral, the coexis- 
tence of the two rates of return, u and F, would imply the stated percentage of expected nonre- 
payment  on the higher-yielding  foreign bonds.  To  the extent that purchasers  are risk-averse, 
(u - P)/(l  + u) overstates their expectation of capital losses and instead reflects their aversion 
to the asset with the higher contracted yield. 
Our sample excluded bonds issued in the 1970s and 1980s, except for those issued by Australia. 
We sought to follow all external bond issues up to about 1970. Specifically, our bond populations 
stopped with bonds issued in the following final years: Argentina, 1968; Australia, 1978; Brazil 
and Chile, 1930; Canada, 1967; Egypt, Japan and Turkey, 1965; Mexico, 1966; and Russia, 1916. 
All subsequent flows were followed through 1983, after which the remaining small balances were 
assumed to be paid off. 229  How Sovereign Debt Has Worked 
to defaults, not to ex post inflation, which affected both home-bond 
and foreign-bond returns similarly. Second, the ex ante rates in table 
10.1 did not differ across countries in any way that consistently foretold 
the international differences in  ex post returns. The wide differences 
in realized returns were either poorly predicted or, as seems more likely, 
simply impossible to predict. 
Real realized returns are summarized in table  10.2, with values in 
sterling at 1913 prices converted into 1913-price dollars at $4.86. Leav- 
ing the details in individual-country experience to the fuller version of 
this study, we examine the global returns. 
10.2.3  Global Returns to Lenders, in the Bond Era and since 1973 
Combining the ten countries’ diverse experiences, table 10.2 shows 
that investors made more on bond lending to foreign governments than 
on  safer home governments,  despite the revolutions  and the Great 
Depression.  Foreign bondholders  got  a net  return  premium  of  0.44 
percent per annum on all bonds outstanding anytime between 1850 and 
about 1970 (with payments carry-over traced through 1983). Curiously 
enough, the bonds issued in the troubled years between 1915 and 1945 
Table 10.2  Realized Real Returns on Bond Lending to Ten Foreign 
Governments,  1850-1970,  with Payments through 1983 
Rates of Return(%)  ($ mill. at 1913 prices) 
Borrowing 
Nation  n  U  P  v -?  NPV  LO  - 
Argentina  187 
Brazil  143 
Chile  60 
52 
Four Latins  442 


















3.52  1.56 
2.97  2.14 
1.66  1.88 
-0.21  1.72  - 
2.65  1.75 
3.00  1.97 
1.91  0.35 
6.21  3.68 
2.90  1.33 
1.31  2.94 
1.29  2.58 
2.40  2.14 
2.47  2.05 
I .96 
0.83 
-  0.22 
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Notes:  The algebraic symbols are defined as in table 10.  I, except that real rates replace 
nominal. The rates of return, u and F,  now contain subtractions for the ex post rate of 
consumer-price inflation in the lending country, and every flow is deflated by a lending- 
country consumer price index. 
The present figures are based on a larger set of  bonds than in table 10.1. Conversion 
bonds, aimed at reviving payments on previous problem bonds, are now included. In 
some cases these were attached to the records of  the previous problem bonds, while in 
other cases they were entered as separate bonds. 230  Peter H. Lindert/Peter J. Morton 
fared better (for creditors) than those issued back in the prewar golden 
age. The bonds issued between  1850 and 1914 barely broke even with 
home-government bonds in the ex post measures used here, while those 
from 1915 to 1945 realized a premium of  1.21 percent. 
Have creditors fared better or worse on loans to foreign governments 
since 1973? Like their bond-era predecessors in table 10.1 above, they 
charged roughly a 2 percent interest premium in ex ante nominal terms. 
So far, up to the landmark Brazilian suspension of payments in February 
1987, virtually the full debt service was honored. The flurry of resched- 
ulings in the period 1982-86 had little effect on realized rates of interest, 
offering debtors little relief. To be sure, financial markets have come 
to expect a breakdown of debt service. The informal secondary market 
for banks’ loans to problem debtors has discounted Third World loans 
by about a third. Top U.S.  banks have posted over $16 billion in reserve- 
addition loss, a significant part of  it an expected loss on foreign debt. 
Yet these market expectations of banks’ losses greatly exceed the short- 
fall of  realized  debt service. As of the end of  1986, creditors could 
afford a write-down of 9.2 percent and still receive the same ex post 
return they would have received from U.S. government bonds of  the 
same maturities as the loans to the third World. By taking a 4.0 percent 
loss, alternatively, they could have reaped the same 0.42 percent pre- 
mium over U.S. bonds that their bond-era predecessors received.  Or 
they could suffer major losses if the pessimism of the secondary loan 
market is correct. The jury is still out. 
10.2.4  Past Problem Debtors Have Become Problem Debtors 
There  is a curious tendency  toward  historical  consistency in  the 
identities of the defaulters. The set of  borrowing countries defaulting 
(wholly or partially) before World War I had  a higher probability of 
default in  the  1930s than did other countries receiving loans in  the 
1920s. Again, the set of  borrowing countries defaulting either before 
1930 or in the 1930s had a higher probability of  needing concessionary 
“rescheduling”  of loans since World War 11. 
Table 10.3 summarizes the historical consistency in the identities of 
the defaulters and reschedulers.  The shares of countries falling into 
problem-debtor  status (default, arrears, or, in  the  1980s, signing re- 
scheduling agreements) are contrasted between two kinds of countries: 
those with and those without such status in an earlier period. We  chose 
periods long enough so that a worldwide wave of defaults had time to 
abate, allowing a renewal of  worldwide lending. There is a striking 
pattern of statistical significance. In either worldwide lending crisis (the 
1930s and 1980-86),  the problem debtors tended to be those who had 
had problems earlier. The pattern holds whether one looks across all 
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Table 10.3  Historical Rates of Transition into Problem-Debtor Status, among 
Five Periods, 1820-1986 
Among  Among 
Earlier  Earlier 
Full  Problem  Difference in 
Repayers  Debtors  Transition rates 
Earlier 
period -+  Later period  n  6,  n  ?id  8,j - 8,  (signif.) 
A. AN  debtors 
1880-  I929 +  1930s 
1820-79  -+  1930s 
1930s +  1940-79 
1940-79 -+  1980-86 
1820-  1929 4  1980-86 
1930s -+  1980-86 
B. Developing-country debtors only 
1820-79  -+  1880-1929 
1880-1929 +  1930s 
1820-1929 +  1930s 
1930s +  1940-79 
1940-79  --z  1980-86 
1820- I929 +  1980-86 
1930s -+  1980 -  86 

















































































n  = number of countries covered. 
8 = share of sovereign debtor governments becoming problem debtors in the later period. 
* = difference is significant at the 5%  level with a two-tailed test. 
* * = difference is significant at the  1%  level with a two-tailed test. 
“Sovereign debtor governments”  are national or local governments in those countries 
whose national government was recognized as sovereign in budget setting and contract law 
in both the earlier and the later period, and which actually received foreign loans within 
both  periods.  Excluded (as nondebtors) are four usually-creditor nations:  U.S., U.K., 
France, Germany. “Problem debtors” are those whose national or local governmetns did 
not repay contracted external debt in full, whether through repudiation or through recorded 
arrears lasting more than a year or (1980-86  only) signing rescheduling agreements with 
creditors. 
reject the notion that repayments breakdown in crises is uncorrelated 
with the same nation’s distant debt history. 
10.2.5  Were Defaulters Punished? 
A clear result from the history of rates of return on sovereign debt 
relates to the ex post treatment of those who fell into arrears: The only 
ones punished were a few countries defaulting in isolation before 1918. 
The majority of nonrepayers “escaped” punishment during global crises. 
In the 1930s, debtors may have seemed to suffer credit cutoffs and 
trade retaliation, but the impression misleads. In that crisis and its long 
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indiscriminate in their denial of fresh credits: Almost no governments 
in less developed countries got fresh loans, whether they were repaying 
old ones or not. Even trade policy, which had the chance to discriminate 
in the bilateralism of the 1930s, was not used to discriminate against 
defaulters  or in  favor  of  faithful  repayers.  Protectionism  was  too 
sweeping. 
In the enthusiastic lending of  the  1974-82  wave, lenders paid  no 
attention to past histories of  default. Between 1976 and 1979, for ex- 
ample, the same interest premia were charged to those Third World 
countries that had repaid faithfully in the past and those who had not. 
In  the  1980s, the signs of  discrimination against problem debtors 
remain weak. Bond lending has virtually dried up, and the revival of 
bank  lending has  been  very  meager, for countries who have repaid 
faithfully as well as for those demanding repeated rescheduling. What- 
ever the private wisdom of the pervasiveness of  creditor pessimism, 
the external cost of repayments breakdown  seems as evident in  the 
1980s as in the 1930s: Some faithful repayers (e.g., Colombia, Egypt) 
have suffered credit contraction along with problem debtors. 
Thus the seeming irrelevance of repayments history in creditors’ eyes 
is itself a lesson of  history. It predicts that borrowers will not suffer 
much by following the lead of Peru and Bolivia in 1984 and Brazil and 
Ecuador in  1987 in cutting repayments and demanding partial write- 
downs of debt, at least if  they do so collectively. 
10.3  Options for Handling Debt Crises: Some Suggestions from 
History and Theory 
A combination of history and theory offers tentative lessons on deal- 
ing with a repayments crisis once it  has already occurred.  What is 
special about the  lingering crisis  of  the  1980s is official third-party 
intervention, led by  the IMF. 
To understand what difference the third-party option makes in a debt 
crisis, we start with an analytical framework developed elsewhere (Lin- 
dert 1986). The framework derives much of its power from the definition 
of a debt crisis: A debt crisis exists $ in the absence of  a better offer, 
the debtor would rather impose unilateral nonrepayment  than repay 
fulfy.  By definition, simple full repayment by the debtor, with no outside 
help,  is  ruled  out.  Further,  the definition of  a debt  crisis  makes  it 
virtually  a situation of revealed overlending,  so that merely lending 
more on the same terms cannot erase the default incentive except under 
implausible conditions. The alternatives to destructive default reduce 
to two: either (1)  write-downs of  part of  the debt (either unilaterally 
or through  bilateral  negotiation), or (2) third-party  rescue packages 
(sometimes involving relending by the original creditors). Either option 
brings gains in world wealth by avoiding destructive penalties by  the 233  How Sovereign Debt Has Worked 
creditors, the damage value of which would not be fully recaptured by 
them. And either accelerates the renewal of fresh lending, relative to 
doing nothing about the crisis. But they differ in other important respects. 
10.3.1 
Partial  debt write-downs can work, and have worked, in a variety 
of ways. They can be imposed unilaterally by debtors, in the knowledge 
that the creditors cannot inflict sufficient damage to dissuade them. In 
this unilateral case, the debtor calculates the share of write-down that 
would push marginal benefits down to the marginal cost (direct  penalties 
and loss of borrower surplus on later credit) of extra repudiation. Cred- 
itors then decide whether to take the imposed settlement or to hold 
out indefinitely. The unilateral variant was imposed by Brazil in 1943, 
and by  the end of the decade most creditors had taken what Brazil 
offered. Credit to Brazil was slow to revive thereafter, but probably 
no slower than it was for better-repaying Third World countries. 
A smoother and more bilateral process is one in which the debtor, 
in announcing a plan for partial  write-down,  chooses terms that are 
more likely to win quick acquiescence by creditors, possibly in con- 
sultation with creditors. Two excellent illustrations were the Mexican 
decrees under Porfk-io  Diaz in  1885  and Argentina’s Romero Plan of 
1893. In both cases, creditors soon gave their collective approval, and 
repayments and fresh lending promptly followed. 
Still  more bilateral  are cases in  which  the two sides work out a 
compromise from the start. This is easiest in cases where the debtor 
is willing to write down very little, i.e., cases closer to  pure rescheduling 
with no change in capitalized contractual value. The Brazilian refunding 
loans of  1898  and 1914, worked out with the help of the Rothchilds, 
serve as examples. These refunding loans, incidentally,  were accom- 
panied by conditionality, with Brazil restricting her money supply as 
part of the bargain. 
The two-party (and unilateral) write-downs were not always prompt 
or tidy. In some cases delays were involved, and in others no solution 
was reached. Massive total default was the outcome of the Mexican, 
Russian, and Turkish Revolutions and in many cases of default during 
the 1930s. History, like existing game theory, has no way of assuring 
a smooth outcome of international debt conflict. But the mechanisms 
of direct bargaining and write-downs are traditional and simple, and 
free of the special complications arising from the remaining alternative, 
third-party intervention. 
10.3.2  The Three-Party Approach 
Postwar international debt settlements have been shaped by the in- 
tervention  of such third parties as the IMF, the Paris Club, and the 
World  Bank. The period  of  most  intense activity,  the  attempts to 
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reschedule and renegotiate debt since the crisis became acute in 1982, 
has revealed special problems with the three-party approach, both in 
practice and as a stylized ideal type. 
In practice, third-party  intervention  has brought  delays and tem- 
porizing  rollovers.  The rescheduling  agreements have basically just 
postponed and capitalized debt service, without any real concessionary 
terms. They have also become addictive:  Almost  every country in- 
volved in rescheduling since 1978 has been covered by new agreements 
ever since. The lingering uncertainty over the shape of the ultimate 
settlement is, we suspect, a major force depressing capital formation 
throughout the Third World since 1982. 
The stylized three-party approach would involve a relending rescue 
not yet evident  in  actual practice.  The third  party would  give  new 
concessionary loans, bailing out the original creditors and granting a 
capital gain (a partial default) to the debtors, at the expense of  distant 
taxpayers. If such genuine concessions were forthcoming, they would 
replace the problems of existing practice with two new problems. One 
is the difficulty of prescribing the right amount of austerity to the debtor 
as part of the settlement, given that the amount of debt outstanding 
competes with the macroeconomic  need for austerity as a yardstick 
for gaining concessions. More basic is the familiar problem of moral 
hazard: Any concession is a reward for testing the Limits of prudence, 
inviting more unstable lending in the future, with greater disruption to 
world investment. To become a superior alternative to two-party debt 
adjustments, the three-party approach would have to provide new so- 
lutions for these basic problems. 
10.4  Summary 
A  closer look at the history of international lending has furthered 
our understanding of the debt-crisis dynamic on two fronts. First, the 
workings  of the process in the absence of international agencies like 
the IMF has been illuminated with historical measures of ex ante and 
ex post returns. Defaults notwithstanding, investors between 1850 and 
about 1970 earned sizeable premia on the overall portfolio of loans to 
the ten top borrowing governments. Chile, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey 
were exceptions, bringing foreign creditors lower returns than domestic 
bonds. Since 1974, creditors have received sufficient service that they 
could now withstand significant partial defaults and still earn the his- 
torical premia over lending to their home governments. Countries that 
had  defaulted  in  the past  were  significantly  more  likely  to become 
problem debtors again. Yet  defaulting governments have seldom been 
punished, either with direct sanctions or with discriminatory denial of 
later credit. 235  How Sovereign Debt Has Worked 
Second, policy options for debt-crisis management can be appraised 
by  contrasting the recent debt negotiations under IMF-World  Bank 
tutelage with the more direct bargaining approach of the bond era. The 
assistance of  the international  agencies has raised  several problems 
avoided by  the older bilateral mechanism.  Partial debt write-downs, 
imposed by the borrowers with creditor acquiescence, might dominate 
all other policy options. 
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